IEEE 1725:2011 pdf free download – IEEE Standard for Rechargeable Batteries for Cellular Telephones
counterfeit batteries: Products that are intentionally labeled to mislead the purchaser of a battery.Forexample,the battery may be marked as being “genuine”orapproved for use” by a specific originalequipment manufacturer (OEM).
critical: (A) Of, relating to, or being a turning point or an especially important juncture.(B)Relating to orbeing a state in which, or a measurement or point at which, some quality, property , or phenomenon suffersa definite change.
NOTE—Critical limits, critical steps,traceability plans, and so on may be considered to be critical design factors. Such parameters aredetermined by the manufacturcr/supplicr.
design analysis: The evaluation of a design to determine correctness with respect to stated requirements,conformance to design standards, system efficiency, and other criteria， including consideration of systemaging and usage over the life of the product.
electrostatic discharge (ESD): Electrical discharges of static electricity that build up on personnel orequipment generated by interaction of dissimilar materials.The discharge may damage sensitivecomponents and render them inoperative.
embedded battery: A battery that is not intended to be replaced or serviced by the end user/consumer.
failure mode: The manner in which failure occurs, generally categorized as electrical, mechanical, thermal,or contamination. It can be associated with a defect or use outside of specification.
failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA): A systematic group of cross-functional team activities whosepurpose is to identify and evaluate the potential failure of a product [design FMEA(DFMEA)] or process[process FMEA (PFMEA)J, and to ensure that such failure modes have been properly understood andprioritized for action. It includes evaluation of the severity of such failures，relative frequency ofoccurrence，and probability of detection and thus containment. The results of these activities aredocumented and updated as required.
fault: A physical condition that causes a device, a component,or an element to fail to perform in therequired manner. Examples include short circuits, broken wires, and intermittent connections and softwareerrors.
hazard: An undesirable result of one or more faults that includes a forceful rupture of the battery packandor projectile emission,fire, or flame outside of the battery enclosure; noticeable quantity of smoke;release of toxic，corrosive,or dangerous materials in excess of recognized health and safety standards;electric shock that exceeds accepted standards; systems or components generating untouchable surfaces;and leakage of liquid outside of the system enclosure.
host (host device): The device that is powered by a battery andor charges the battery. Mobile phones areexamples of a host device.
incompatible batteries: Battery products that do not meet the proper mechanical andor electricalrequirements for safe and reliable operation of the host device.
intended use: Use of a product in accordance with specifications，instructions， and information providedby the manufacturer/supplier.
manufacturer/supplier: An entity that designs, assembles, and/or markets finished mobile telephones orcel1s, battery packs, and/or systems, as appropriate.
4.1 Introduction
The scope of this clause sets forth provisions for conducting design analyses for cell, pack, host devices,and power adapters and an overall system-level design analysis of the combination of these,including theend user. The design analyses shall be conducted to reduce hazards (as defined in Clause 3) from occurringas a result of one or two independent faults while in intended use, depending on the scenario. The analysisshall consider two independent faults for charge and one fault for discharge and storage situations. Thedesign analysis shall also be conducted to reduce hazards from occurring due to reasonable and foreseeablemisuse.
Table 1 lists several different design analysis techniques that can be used.Conditions beyond reasonableand foresecable misuse are outside the ‘scope of this standard.Although design analyses should bethorough, it is not practical to address every conceivable scenario. Such an approach would prove onerousand unrealistic. Furthermore, cell design and manufacturing quality is fundamental to safe system design,as cell faults that create a hazard cannot be mitigated by external subsystems. To minimize hazards, there isno substitute for the use of high-quality cells manufactured in accordance with Clause 5